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This study investigated how great apes and human infants use imperative pointing to request objects. In a
series of three experiments (infants, N = 44; apes, N = 12), subjects were given the opportunity to either point
to a desired object from a distance or else to approach closer and request it proximally. The apes always
approached close to the object, signaling their request through instrumental actions. In contrast, the infants
quite often stayed at a distance, directing the experimenters’ attention to the desired object through index-
finger pointing, even when the object was in the open and they could obtain it by themselves. Findings
distinguish 12-month-olds’ imperative pointing from ontogenetic and phylogenetic earlier forms of ritualized
reaching.
It is widely believed that human imperative point-
ing to request objects is somehow simpler than
human declarative pointing to share attention (e.g.,
Camaioni, 1993; Gomez, Sarria, & Tamarit, 1993;
Tomasello & Camaioni, 1997). One piece of evi-
dence for this proposal is that, in some studies at
least, imperative pointing emerges first in human
ontogeny (Camaioni, Perucchini, Bellagamba, &
Colonnesi, 2004; but see Carpenter, Nagell, & Tom-
asello, 1998). Moreover, infants’ earliest imperative
gestures are often effected by more open-hand
pointing rather than index-finger pointing, resem-
bling a kind of ritualized reaching (Blake et al.,
1994). Another piece of evidence is that children
with autism point imperatively but not declara-
tively (Baron-Cohen, 1989). Moreover, although
nonhuman primates do not point at all for one
another in their natural communication, captive
great apes do not point declaratively but do point
for humans imperatively to request objects (Call &
Tomasello, 1994; Leavens & Hopkins, 1999).
This traditional analysis relies on a characteriza-
tion of imperative pointing as ritualized reaching
and declarative pointing as the sharing of mental
states. However, there are at least two interpreta-
tions of imperative object requests (Bruner, 1975).
On a lean level, gestural requests do indeed reflect
the signaling of an individual action attempt to
obtain an object. Such signaling originates from
ontogenetically ritualized instrumental behaviors,
like reaching. The intention becomes apparent in
the instrumental action pattern (“instrumental
request”). In contrast, on a richer level requests are
part of human cooperative communication. They
work by directing another’s attention to something
within common ground, with the expectation that
attending to that thing will lead her to infer the
communicator’s communicative intention. The ges-
ture is “decontextualized” from instrumental action
patterns. Requesting does not require acting out the
content of a message; directing someone’s attention
is sufficient (“cooperative request”).
One question is then which of the two interpreta-
tions is correct for infants’ request when they begin
pointing around 12 months of age? Differentiating
simpler instrumental requests from cooperative
communicative requests is important to delineate
the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of human
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communication. Although apes in captivity have
been reported to point imperatively to request food
and objects from humans, they do so with the
whole hand close to the caging, sometimes banging
and vocalizing in concert (Leavens, Hopkins, &
Thomas, 2004). Sometimes they also protrude the
index finger through the mesh or hole in the cag-
ing, with some indication that the index-finger
extension is influenced by the size of the openings
in the mesh (Leavens, Ely, Hopkins, & Bard, 2012).
Their gestures are clearly communicative acts and
not serious attempts at reaching, as apes do not do
this when they are alone (the so-called audience
effect; e.g., Call & Tomasello, 1994; Kaminski, Call,
& Tomasello, 2008). Apes’ requests are therefore
often interpreted as imperative pointing, akin to
human infants’ pointing. However, it is not known
on which level apes’ and infants’ requests operate,
and whether they reveal phylogenetic similarities or
differences in nonverbal gestural communication.
To determine the level of infants’ and apes’
requests it is important to delineate the situations
in which they request. In the prototypical situa-
tions, the desirable object is out of reach and inac-
cessible to the subject. Subjects are thus hindered
by environmental constraints to retrieve the objects
by themselves. There are subtle differences between
the paradigms employed with infants and apes.
Infants are usually proximally constrained, for
example, by a high chair, and cannot move close
enough to the desired object to retrieve it (e.g.,
Franco & Butterworth, 1996). A forward-leaning
body, as if trying to or signaling the attempt to
obtain the object may result from the proximal con-
straint. On a lean interpretation of infant imperative
pointing, if the proximal constraints were removed,
then infants should move toward the desired target
to signal their retrieval attempt or try to retrieve
the item by themselves. In contrast, if infants’
requests went beyond signaling retrieval attempts
and were based primarily on directing others’ atten-
tion, then infants should point to the desired items,
even when they could approach these by them-
selves. With regard to apes, the constraints are
slightly different. Apes are distally constrained by
the caging. They can freely move around within
their enclosure and adopt any position, but they
cannot access the reward outside the caging. On a
lean interpretation of apes’ imperative pointing,
apes should thus always move as close as possible
to the caging that blocks access to the desired item,
to make their retrieval attempts apparent to the
human keeper. In contrast, if apes’ requests went
beyond signaling retrieval attempts through their
action patterns and was instead primarily based on
directing others’ attention, apes should sometimes
also point from a distance, with hand and arm
extended free in the air, instead of approaching the
desired items as close as possible.
This study tested the two interpretations of
requests in infants and apes, trying to provide evi-
dence against the lean interpretation of imperative
pointing. We assessed infants’ and apes’ perfor-
mance in comparable situations in which access to
desired items was distally blocked by caging. The
proximal constraints were removed such that par-
ticipants could freely move around, and their will-
ingness and motivation to do so was established in
a separate locomotion control test. We tested
whether infants (Experiment 1) and apes (Experi-
ment 2), when centered at one place, would point
from there with hands and arms free in the air, to
direct attention to desired items at a distance,
instead of approaching the blocked items as close
as possible and signal their intention to obtain these
through their approach behavior. In Experiment 3, a
follow-up on infants’ performance in Experiment 1
was done and it was tested whether infants would
point to desired items even when they could easily
access these by themselves. Recruiting someone’s help
in tasks that one can solve by oneself reveals a prefer-
ence to collaborate (Rekers, Haun, & Tomasello, 2011;
Warneken, Gr€afenhain, & Tomasello, 2012) and
provides evidence for the interpretation of imperative
pointing as a cooperative request.
Experiment 1
Infants were centered at one side of the room with
a game. We tested whether infants would direct the
experimenter’s attention by pointing from there to
desired but blocked items at another place, or
whether they would signal their individual attempt
of wanting to obtain the objects by moving as close
as possible to the blocked items. We manipulated
also the distance between pointer and desired item,
to determine whether effort to move would increase
the likelihood to point. A locomotion control test
assured that all infants were motivated and able to
crawl to the blocked items.
Method
Participants
Twenty 12-month-old infants participated (10
boys; M = 12.8, range = 12.5–12.9). Infants were
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recruited using a database to which parents volun-
tarily subscribed to participate in studies. Parents
were asked upon recruitment whether their infant
already pointed. Only infants who were able to
point were invited for testing. One additional infant
was tested but excluded because she did not pass
the locomotion test (see the Procedure section).
Apparatus
The study setup consisted of a 190 9 133 cm car-
pet on the floor, with the infant and E1 sitting on
one end and E2 with additional objects on the other
end (see Figure 1). E1, the infant, and parent each
sat on a 0.6 9 0.6 m cushion to mark the location
for each person. E1 sat to the right of the infant
while the parent was situated to the other side of
the infant, to the back. E2 sat on a small stool at
the other end of the carpet behind a 1.23 9 0.4 9
0.75 m wooden cage with mesh in front.
We used two toys for the study. The first was a
transparent marble track in which one could insert
colored ping-pong balls. The second was a trans-
parent chute in which one could insert colored wal-
nuts. The chute made a xylophone sound each time
a walnut was inserted. At the start of a session E1
and the infant always had two objects (balls or wal-
nuts) at their disposal. Eight additional objects were
placed on a tray, which was placed behind the
mesh in the cage at the other side of the carpet. The
infant could see the additional objects. The meshed
cage was placed at two different distances from the
infant. The far distance was 1.8 m (distal condition;
clearly out of reach) and the close distance 0.95 m
(proximal condition; just out of reach). Distances
were blocked and the order of distances was coun-
terbalanced across participants. Infants received
two test trials per block, thus totaling four trials.
Procedure
Before the actual testing session, the two experi-
menters played with the infant to familiarize her
with the surroundings as a warm-up. Each block
consisted of a demonstration and a test phase.
Demonstration phase. At the start of the session
E1 and the infant had two objects at their disposal.
E1 first demonstrated the toy by putting one object
into the chute and then encouraged the infant to do
the same. When the second object was put in the
chute, E1 stated that she wanted to continue
(“Yeah, let’s do that again!”) and subsequently
commented on the fact that they were out of objects
(“Oh, hmm, all gone!”). E2 responded to this by
stating clearly to the infant and E1 that she had
more and gave two more objects from the cage to
E1, who in turn gave them to the infant to put in
the chute. After the infant had put this second pair
of objects into the chute the sequence was repeated
with a third pair of objects. Infants thus had the
opportunity to throw in five objects in three dem-
onstration sequences. The test phase started after
the infant had put the third set of objects in the
chute.
Test phase. At the end of the third demonstration
sequence, E1 stated that she wanted to continue and
commented that they were out of objects. This time,
however, E2 did not respond but instead was turned
to the side, facing away from the play situation and
pretending to be occupied with something else. E1
tried to prompt the infant to request for more objects
by encouraging her to continue with the game (“This
is fun! Let’s continue!”). She repeated this sentence
twice in case of no immediate response. In case the
infant requested by either pointing or crawling to the
mesh E1 notified E2 by commenting on the infants’
behavior (“Yeah, do you want more?”). E2 would
Figure 1. Setup of Experiment 1: The desired items are blocked behind cage mesh (a) at distal distance of 1.8 m and (b) at proximal
distance of 0.95 m.
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then turn back to the play situation and take two
objects from the tray to give to E1. E1 then gave them
to the infant and they would continue. In case the
infant did not respond, E2 delivered more objects to
E1 after 20 s. Then the second test trial started with
the same procedure. After finishing the first block,
E1 and the infant received a new toy from E2, and E2
moved the cage with additional objects to the second
distance (proximal or distal; the order was counter-
balanced across participants) and the same proce-
dure was repeated for the second block.
Locomotion. We administered a locomotion check
in case infants had not moved to the objects during
a testing session. At the end of the session, E2
would take a ball and invite the infant to come
over and play with the ball from the other side of
the room to establish if she was able and motivated
to locomote independently to the objects.
Coding and Reliability
The first response in each test trial was coded and
used for analysis, since in theory infants could point
multiple times to request during a test trial, but could
only crawl over once. A point was coded if the arm
was half or fully extended with the index finger pro-
truded (“index-finger point”) or the fingers stretched
(“hand point”). The hand palm could either be facing
up or down. “Crawling” was coded if the infant
moved forward on its own to the tray with addi-
tional objects. A naive second person coded the four
test trials for 30% of the infants (N = 6), yielding a
Cohen’s j = .88 over a percentage agreement of 91%.
Results
All infants passed the locomotion test and com-
pleted more than one test trial. Three infants did
not show a response. Nine infants only pointed,
and seven infants only crawled. One infant used
both strategies (McNemar test, binomial distribu-
tion, p = .804; see left panel of Figure 2).
Nineteen of the 20 infants completed both trials
at both distances (1 infant completed only the distal
condition). Given the rank data quality (two trials
per condition) we conducted nonparametric tests.
Figure 3 shows the mean proportion of trials in
which infants pointed or crawled as a function of
distance. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test revealed no
significant difference for the mean proportion of tri-
als in which infants pointed or crawled (N = 20,
z = 1.25, p = .21). However, Wilcoxon tests for each
condition revealed that in the distal condition,
infants pointed more than they crawled (N = 20,
z = 2.12, p = .035). In the proximal condition, these
differences were not significant (N = 19, z = .351,
p = .726). Similar results were obtained with a para-
metric 2 (behavior) 9 2 (distance) 9 2 (order) mixed
analysis of variance (ANOVA). It yielded a mar-
ginal effect of behavior suggesting more pointing
than crawling, F(1, 17) = 4.28, p = .054, and a sig-
nificant interaction between distance and behavior,
F(1, 17) = 5.64, p = .030, revealing more pointing
than crawling in the distal condition: simple effects,
F(1, 17) = 11.63, p = .003. There was also a signifi-
cant interaction between behavior and order, F(1,
17) = 7.93, p = .012, suggesting more pointing than
crawling when the distal condition was adminis-
tered first: simple effects, F(1, 17) = 10.31, p = .005,
and a marginal interaction between distance and
order, F(1, 17) = 4.12, p = .058, suggesting more
behavior in the condition that was administered
first (simple effects, ns).
The majority of points were with the extended
index finger (69%). In the distal condition, 71% of
the points were with the index finger, and in the
Figure 2. Number of participants who either only pointed, only
moved, or displayed both or none of the behaviors to obtain the
desired item.
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proximal condition, 67% of the points were with
the index finger. A within-subject comparison
(N = 10) on the mean proportion of index-finger
points revealed no differences between conditions
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = .322, p = .748).
Discussion
When proximal constraints were removed and
infants could freely move around, infants often
remained at their position and pointed from a dis-
tance. Infants did not always move as close as pos-
sible to the desired objects. This finding thus rejects
the lean alternative that infants convey their
requests only through their instrumental action pat-
terns of retrieving objects. Instead, findings are con-
sistent with the interpretation that infants’
imperative pointing is a cooperative communicative
act that directs others’ attention within common
ground to desired objects, with the expectation that
the recipient will do as one wishes.
Infants pointed more often when the objects were
farther away, and their points were predominantly
done with the index finger. Presumably infants
understood that it was more efficient to direct the
adult’s attention to the distal inaccessible objects than
to crawl there. It is important to recall that all infants
were able to crawl to the distal objects when
prompted to do so in the locomotion test.
About half of the infants pointed and half of
them crawled, with only one infant using both
strategies. However, while our locomotion check
confirmed that all infants could crawl to the objects,
infants were not submitted to a similar pointing
check in the current setup. It is possible that infants
who did not point in the current situation were
intimidated or not motivated to point. It is also
important to note that infants were not familiarized
or exposed to the cage before, so that it is not clear
whether all infants knew that they could not open
the cage. Indeed, it is possible that infants who did
not point simply approached the cage to explore
the mesh instead of signaling their request to obtain
the blocked items. While it is thus possible that
more infants would point under more favorable
and controlled situations, the current findings
clearly demonstrate that the 12-month-olds who
pointed in this setting used a communicative, atten-
tion-directing, object-retrieval strategy rather than
that they signaled through instrumental action pat-
terns their intentions to obtain an object. Experi-
ment 2 investigated apes’ performance in a design
analogous to Experiment 1 to test whether apes,
too, request like human infants do.
Experiment 2
Analogous to Experiment 1 we centered apes at
one side of the cage by providing them with desir-
able food items (bananas). Staying at the location
was rewarded since food items were offered only at
that location. More food items were available at
another, distal location. We administered only a
distal condition, since the distal condition elicited
more pointing in infants and should be more costly
in terms of locomotion, thus maximizing the likeli-
hood of eliciting distal pointing. As in Experiment
1, we tested whether apes would refrain from mov-
ing as close as possible to the desired items outside
their cage and instead direct a keeper’s attention to
the items from afar with a freestanding pointing
gesture. We reasoned that if apes point impera-
tively like human 12-month-olds, they should at
least sometimes stay put at the location where they
always obtained the desired food, and point from
there to obtain more food. Alternatively, if apes’





































Figure 3. Experiment 1: Mean proportion of trials in which
infants pointed or crawled to the blocked items as a function of
distance. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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environmental constraints of the caging, we
expected apes to always approach the desirable
reward as close as possible or necessary to make
their request apparent through their individual
action patterns of retrieving objects. We used
human keepers instead of conspecifics as recipients
since apes have been observed to point only in cap-
tivity and only for human keepers, not conspecifics.
Method
Participants
We tested 12 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and 4
bonobos (Pan paniscus) at the Wolfgang K€ohler Pri-
mate Research Center, Leipzig, Germany. All apes
were familiar with the zoo setting, testing, and the
keepers. Two chimpanzees were hand raised by
human keepers in a zoo setting. The rest of the par-
ticipating individuals had no specific history of en-
culturation. One chimpanzee and three bonobos
were tested in addition, but excluded because of
experimenter error (one bonobo) or because they
could not be interested in participating in the task.
There were five males and seven females with age
ranges from 9 to 35 years (M = 17.7). Subjects were
tested individually, except for two individuals who
were accompanied by their infants. All subjects par-
ticipated voluntarily and were previously or cur-
rently participating in other studies so they were
used to participating in tests. Also, all subjects had
participated in previous pointing studies.
Apparatus
The participants were tested in a setup similar to
that of the infants in Experiment 1. Instead of toys,
a food reward in the form of banana pieces was
used to ensure that the participants were engaged
and motivated to request for more during testing.
Testing occurred in an enclosure that consisted
of multiple adjacent mesh cages, which were con-
nected via open sliding doors. E1 sat in the far left
(closed off) cage of the enclosure to deliver the food
to the participant. E2 was located in front of one of
the cages, 6 m to the right. E1 used a low table to
display the food and a transparent food dispenser
to deliver the food. E2 had a large transparent
bucket filled with banana pieces placed in front of
her on a tripod at a height that was easily visible
for the participants. The apes had free access to all
cages between E1 and E2 (see Figure 4).
The experimenters used a muted walkie-talkie to
signal trial start and ending without distracting the
participants through additional noise. Pressing the
button on one walkie-talkie produced a visible cue
on the display of the other walkie-talkie. Three
cameras were placed to capture all distance from
E1 to E2 to be able to record any behavior invisible
to E1 and E2 during testing.
Procedure
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment
1 with some slight adjustments. Every session
started with a demonstration phase followed by a
test phase. Subjects received four test trials in the
distal condition. We used a distance of 6 m, the
longest distance possible within the constraints
imposed by the enclosure, to increase the incentive
to stay centered at the feeding location.
Demonstration phase. The demonstration phase
was included to familiarize the apes with the fact
that E2 was willing to supply more food in case
Figure 4. Schematic drawing of the setup in Experiment 2.
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they were out and that E2 would only provide
them with more food indirectly, via E1. E1 sat
behind the table with four pieces of banana. At the
start of the experiment, E1 delivered the four food
items piece by piece to the subject with an interval
of 8 s. After the participant had finished the last
piece of food, E1 signaled E2 via the muted walkie-
talkie and E2 subsequently walked over to E1 with
the bucket of bananas to provide four additional
pieces of food to E1, analogous to the infant study.
When E2 was back at her position, E1 again deliv-
ered the food to the subject. This was repeated
three times, making four demonstration sequences
in total.
Test phase. After the subject had finished the last
piece of food in the demonstration phase, E1 again
signaled E2 and the test phase started. Analogous
to Experiment 1, E2 did not immediately respond
by walking over, but stayed at her position and
only supplied more food to E1 upon request of the
subject. Participants’ behavior was recorded for
1 min. In case the subject requested for more food
from E2 from anywhere between E1 and E2, she
walked over to E1 to supply more food to E1 and
the next test trial started. Only gestural requests
were acknowledged with more food; any other
behavior (cage banging, vocalizing, etc.) was not
counted as a referential request. Each subject
received four test trials in total. All test trials were
run in the same session as long as the subject kept
requesting on each trial. In case subjects did not
request during a test trial, the session for that day
was ended and continued the next day. Such fol-
low-up sessions again started with a four-trial dem-
onstration phase. Thus, in theory, subjects could
receive four sessions on four subsequent days in
case they did not respond in any test trial.
Coding and Reliability
The same main coder of Experiment 1 coded the
video recordings of the testing sessions. Points were
coded when the arm was fully or half extended,
with only the index finger (“index-finger point”) or
all fingers protruded (“hand point’). In addition,
we counted gestures as hand point that involved
grabbing the mesh near the reward, if this gesture
was repeated several times until E2 responded and
walked over to E1. Repetition in this case was
regarded as persistence and therefore the gesture
was regarded as communicative and intentional.
Distal requests were coded if the subject requested
from anywhere but the enclosure in front of which
E2 was standing, a proximal request involved mov-
ing close to the enclosure where the food was
located. A naive second coder coded the four test
trials for 25% of the participants (N = 4) revealing a
Cohen’s K = 0.81 over a percentage agreement of 93%.
Results
All 12 subjects completed more than one trial.
Two of the chimpanzees showed neither of the rele-
vant behaviors on any of the four trials. Of the
remaining participants, none pointed from the feed-
ing location to the food items during any of the test
trials (see middle panel, Figure 2). Instead, all 10
apes moved as close as possible to the food items
behind the cage and requested from there by pro-
truding the hand through the mesh. None of these
subjects used index-finger points to request; all of
them requested by extending their hands or by hang-
ing their hands in the caging.
Supplementary analyses revealed that all but one
subject requested at least once during the demo-
phases to present banana pieces by protruding their
finger or hand through the caging (43 index-finger
extensions [23 by the bonobo alone]; 22 hand points).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 are in line with pre-
vious findings (e.g., Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard,
1996). When great apes request, they move as close
as possible to the desired item. They do not direct
others’ attention from a distance to the desired item
when they have the choice of approaching it. This
finding supports the original, lean hypothesis that
apes signal their requests through their instrumen-
tal action patterns of retrieving objects rather than
simply directing others’ attention within common
ground.
Importantly, we found evidence that apes did
communicate their requests. Thus, 10 of 12 apes
were observed requesting in their prototypical way
at least once during the experiment, including
index-finger extensions, and previous findings show
that these behaviors are not serious action attempts,
since the behaviors cease if no one is attending (Call
& Tomasello, 1994; Kaminski et al., 2008; Krause &
Fouts, 1997; Leavens et al., 2004). However, the fact
that they always move their body as close as possi-
ble toward the desired item suggests that apes are
using a strategy of enacting their message rather
than presuming the message to be within common
ground so that directing attention from afar would
suffice. Thus, the distal constraint of the caging,
together with the experience of an intention-reading
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cooperative human keeper, presumably lead to
captive apes’ “pointing” behavior.
Removing the distal constraint would inevitably
lead apes to retrieve the desired items by them-
selves, as is evident from their behavior in their
natural habitats. It is not known, however, whether
infants, too, would always resort to an individual
strategy of retrieving fully accessible objects when
given the opportunity or, alternatively, prefer to
cooperate and communicate a request even when
they could fulfill it by themselves at minimal cost.
Slightly older toddlers have been shown to collabo-
rate with a partner in a game they can also play by
themselves (Warneken et al., 2012; see also Fawcett
& Liszkowski, 2012). If it could be shown that
infants point to request items they could access by
themselves, this would provide evidence for a
cooperative communicative use of pointing which
clearly goes beyond the use of instrumental action
patterns. Experiment 3 addressed this issue.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we modified the paradigm of
Experiment 1 by removing not only the proximal
but also the distal constraint. We tested whether
infants would retrieve items in the open by them-
selves or, instead, point at them from a distance to
communicate their request. As in Experiment 1, we
used a proximal and distal distance, to find out
whether effort to move would influence the likeli-
hood of communicative requests.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four 12-month-old infants participated in
Experiment 3 (12 boys; M = 12.8, range = 12.5–12.9).
Infants again were recruited using a database to
which parents voluntarily subscribed to participate
in studies. Parents reported that all infants could
point and locomote independently. Two additional
infants were tested but excluded: one due to fussi-
ness and one infant because it did not pass the
locomotion test.
Apparatus and Procedure
The study used the same setup, procedure, and
demonstrations as in Experiment 1, but without the
mesh box (see Figure 5). This way, the tray with
additional objects was freely accessible to the
infants. As in Experiment 1, we presented the
infants with two different toys at two different dis-
tances, counterbalanced across participants.
Coding and Reliability
The same main coder of Experiments 1 and 2
coded all video recordings of Experiment 3. We
used the same coding scheme as in Experiment 1.
A naive second coder coded test trials of 20% of the
participants (N = 5) yielding a Cohen’s j of 1
(100% agreement).
Results
All infants passed the locomotion test and com-
pleted at least one trial. One infant did not show a
response. Ten infants only pointed and 12 infants
only crawled. One infant used both strategies
(McNemar test, binomial distribution, p = .832; see
right panel of Figure 2).
Sixteen of the 24 infants completed at least one
trial in both distances (of these, 14 infants completed
both trials at both distances). Figure 6 shows the
mean proportion of trials in which infants pointed or
crawled as a function of distance. A Wilcoxon
Figure 5. Setup of Experiment 3: The objects are fully accessible (a) at a distal distance of 1.8 m and (b) at a proximal distance of 0.95 m.
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signed-rank test showed no significant difference for
the mean proportion of trials in which infants
pointed or crawled (N = 24, z = .361, p = .718). Wil-
coxon signed-rank tests for each condition revealed
that infants did not point or crawl more when the
object was far (N = 24, z = 1.25, p = .208) or close
(N = 16, z = 1.52, p = .126). Similar results were
obtained with a parametric 2 (behavior) 9 2 (dis-
tance) 9 2 (order) ANOVA. It yielded no main
effects and a significant interaction between behavior
and distance, F(1, 14) = 7.59, p = .015. Simple effects
revealed no significant differences between behav-
iors for either distance and suggested a tendency for
more pointing in the proximal than the distal condi-
tion, F(1, 14) = 4.43, p = .054.
As for the hand shape, the mean percentage of
index-finger points was 58%. In the distal condition,
58% of the points were with the index finger, and
in the proximal condition 71% of the points were
with the index finger. A within-subject comparison
(N = 11) on the mean proportion of index-finger
points revealed a trend for more index-finger points
in the proximal condition than the distal condition
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z = 1.89, p = .059).
Discussion
When all constraints were removed such that
infants could freely approach the desired objects
and retrieve these by themselves, many infants still
pointed to communicate their request. Often, they
pointed with an extended index finger as adults do
when directing attention to request specific entities
within common ground. The distance from infant
to the desired object did not influence infants’
pointing. Even when the objects were fairly close
and obtainable at minimal cost, infants still chose to
communicate a request by pointing.
As in Experiment 1, there were individual differ-
ences in strategies of object retrieval. Only one of
the infants used both communicative and individ-
ual strategies, while the rest chose either one consis-
tently. Importantly, however, all infants were able
to retrieve the objects by themselves when invited
to do so after the test session. As in Experiment 1,
the procedure did not involve a pointing check,
and so it remains possible that some infants were
inhibited or unmotivated to point in the current lab
situation. However, those infants who did point
could also obtain the objects by themselves. The
stability of these individual differences was not
addressed in this study. However, there is develop-
ing increase in reliance on cooperative strategies in
children’s verbal request (see Shwe & Markman,
1997).
The results show that 12-month-old infants can
choose a communicative over an instrumental strategy.
These findings are in line with previous findings,
which show that toddlers cooperate even when
they can achieve an instrumental goal by them-
selves (Warneken et al., 2012). Choosing to recruit a
partner instead of relying on oneself reveals infants’
social orientation and supports the hypothesis that
by 12 months, preverbal infants’ imperative point-
ing already is a cooperative communicative act.
General Discussion
A “lean” interpretation of nonverbal gestural
requests holds that infants and apes signal their
intention to obtain an item with action patterns that
are instrumental in achieving the goal. On this
interpretation subjects make their object-directed






































Figure 6. Experiment 3: Mean proportion of trials in which
infants pointed or crawled to the fully accessible items as a func-
tion of distance. Error bars represent standard errors of the
mean.
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the desired object as close as possible or necessary
to signal their intention. If the desired object is acces-
sible, the goal of obtaining it is achieved individu-
ally by executing the instrumental action, since
there is no need to communicate one’s desire. In
essence, in this view communication arises from
environmental constraints that prevent subjects
from achieving a goal by themselves (Vauclair,
1990). However, human requests, like other com-
municative acts, build on cooperative principles
that emerged some time in phylogeny and must
develop in ontogeny. When an adult points to a salt
dispenser on the dinner table, it is barely the conse-
quence of a principal impossibility to obtain the dis-
penser, certainly not when it is close by. Instead,
human communicative acts build on cooperative
expectations of acting together and on an under-
standing of each other’s communicative actions
within a shared context (Clark, 1996; Tomasello,
2008). In this alternative view, requests do not
depend on environmental constraints. Instead, these
requests depend on cooperative expectations within
shared common ground, which make it possible to
simply direct others’ attention, without the neces-
sity to act out the content of the message. Such de-
contextualized requests, like canonical index finger
pointing, are not based on instrumental action pat-
terns (see Bruner, 1975).
This study demonstrates that when 12-month-old
infants point to request they communicate on a
cooperative level, independent of environmental
constraints, and not through instrumental action
patterns, like reaching. The study also demonstrates
that nonhuman primates do not request in this
way. Instead, they make their intention to obtain an
item apparent through the instrumental action pat-
terns of obtaining it. Main findings were that when
removing all constraints, infants often directed
attention from a distance to request objects from
others communicatively. This was even the case
when the objects were close by and fully accessible.
Unlike infants, apes never directed attention to the
desired items from afar. Instead, they signaled their
requests by approaching the desired items as close
as possible. Rather than directing attention within
common ground, apes made their intention to
obtain the items apparent through their overt
approach behavior. While the finding with apes
support the idea that object requests in nonhuman
primates arise as a direct consequence of environ-
mental constraints (e.g., Vauclair, 1990), the find-
ings with infants show that around 12 months of
age infants’ requests turn into human cooperative
communication, reflecting a preference for collabo-
ration rather than attempts to overcome constraints
in instrumental acting.
The difference between infants’ and apes’
requests presumably stems from apes’ lack of the
primary communicative goal to direct others’ atten-
tion to desired items outside the dyad. Apes’ natu-
ral gestural communication is an outcome of
interpreting and abbreviating individual actions
(“ontogenetic ritualization”; Tomasello, 2008), with
little evidence that apes arbitrarily direct attention
to things outside the dyad (apes’ food-begging ges-
ture is usually directed at something currently in
possession of the addressee and reflects tolerated
attempts of obtaining food from feeding conspecif-
ics rather than directing attention to it). One possi-
bility is that apes do not coconstruct a cooperative
common ground within which directing attention
would become meaningful as an object-directed
request. For example, studies show that apes,
unlike infants, do not use a hiding context to infer
that a point to a bucket refers to the hidden item
under the bucket (Hare & Tomasello, 2004). And
unlike infants, apes do not use shared experience to
request absent items by directing attention to their
habitual empty places (Liszkowski, Sch€afer, Car-
penter, & Tomasello, 2009). It is doubtful that
home-rearing or other enculturation practices
would yield substantial changes in apes’ coopera-
tive competencies. A study with hand raised juve-
nile chimpanzees confirmed a selective deficit in
tasks requiring a shared common ground or collab-
orative motivation (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005).
Furthermore, a reanalysis of sign-language-trained
chimpanzees’ requests revealed that they used these
signs as “wild cards,” typically accompanied by
instrumental behaviors, to get anything from
human keepers (Rivas, 2005). Interestingly, apes
can control their actions to conceal their behavior in
competitive contexts (Hare, Call, & Tomasello,
2006). Conversely, cooperative settings with human
keepers require control of action in the sense of
intentionally revealing the behavioral attempt.
Some evidence suggests that apes’ instrumental
attempts of obtaining items indeed does involve
exaggerated action patterns, as sometimes seen in
accompanying fretting and banging behaviors
(Leavens et al., 2004).
In contrast to apes, human infants naturally
point to direct attention to external entities in ample
situations, for example, to inform others or to share
interest with them. Such pointing works because it
is meaningful in the background of a shared under-
standing of the interactional situation in which it is
used (Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007).
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Current findings show that when infants point
imperatively they are directing others’ attention
within common ground, just like when they point
declaratively, with the expectation that directing
others’ attention will spur others into action and
make them do as one wishes. Notably, the form of
imperative pointing often entails the otherwise non-
functional extended index finger, as in declarative
acts. By 12 months of age, many infants have thus
developed some expectation that their attention-
directing gesture can function as a request in the
appropriate circumstances and will be complied
with by a cooperative adult. The finding that some
infants even communicate a request when they can
effortlessly retrieve the object by themselves reveals
a preference to collaborate in infants even younger
than previously shown (Rekers et al., 2011; Warne-
ken et al., 2012). Infants’ social interactional experi-
ences of communicating and joint acting in the 1st
year of life presumably transform ontogenetically
earlier individual attempts, like reaching for objects,
into cooperative communicative acts, where the
motivation to cooperate becomes as important as
the motivation to reach an individual goal (see
Grosse, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010; Shwe
& Markman, 1997). It is entirely possible that social
experience shapes development from early on, as
cultural variation in infants’ interactional experience
suggests (Salomo & Liszkowski, 2012). Infants’
developing skills of directing others’ attention to rele-
vant entities and events within shared interactional
situations, together with their developing expecta-
tions for joint acting and an understanding of actions
then give rise to the uniquely human cooperative
communicative act of quotidian imperative pointing,
already before language has emerged in earnest.
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